Talk that was given by Zenonas Tziarras on 20 April 2026 at a seminar titled “The Middle East in a multipolar world: new forms of conflict and cooperation,” organized in Helsinki by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs – FIIA and the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Finland.
Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen
It is a privilege to be with you today and for that I sincerely want to thank the organizers, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Helsinki.
I would like to focus my remarks today on patterns of change and transformation in the broader region of interest. While discussing the Middle East is inevitable for obvious reasons, I also wish to touch upon the Eastern Mediterranean as a sub-region that has acquired growing significance in the 21st century, and whose geopolitical dynamics are today being reshaped by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
A Historical Perspective
Historically, and especially from the perspective of Great Powers, the Eastern Mediterranean was seen as a strategic space, not so much because of its own geopolitical or geo-economic importance but because of its role in allowing the pursuit of greater strategic interests in the Middle East and beyond. In other words, it was an area that needed to be secured or controlled in order for more important objectives to be achieved. By extension, the Eastern Mediterranean has been a space for clashing spheres of influence among great powers but never before was it seen as a space with its own geopolitical identity that stemmed from the relations and interaction among the countries that constitute it.
Since the early 2010s, this has begun to change, as it has increasingly come to be seen as having its own importance and value—in addition to its role as a means to an end for external powers. Why did this happen? The gradual diffusion of global power from the West to the East and the transition towards a more multipolar international system have played a key role. As these shifts unfolded, middle powers, smaller states, and regional actors have been able to exploit emerging power vacuums and pursue their agendas with greater autonomy, while other great powers have gained more space to project influence within and beyond their regions—giving rise to what are sometimes described as “regional hegemons.” In essence, this diffusion of power has elevated the importance of regional dynamics and made the regional level of analysis increasingly central to understanding the international system.
“Constructing” the New Eastern Mediterranean
It was in this context that new dynamics and developments contributed to the view that the Eastern Mediterranean was emerging as a distinct geopolitical space. The discovery of hydrocarbons off Israel,[1] Cyprus, and Egypt in the late 2000s and 2010s led commentators and policymakers alike to pay unprecedented attention to the political, economic, and security relations within this relatively confined geographical area. Historically, oil abundance had been a key driver of great power involvement in the Middle East and of the bridgehead role of the Eastern Mediterranean. Roughly a century later, under very different international circumstances, natural gas has aspired to become the region’s equivalent, giving rise to a new security and geopolitical reality at the regional level.
Simultaneously, new patterns of inter-state enmity and amity were instrumental in reshaping the region’s internal dynamics. Following the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with Israel and Egypt in 2010 and 2013, respectively, new alignments emerged at the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral levels. Among these, the Cyprus–Greece–Israel and Cyprus–Greece–Egypt partnerships stood out. By the end of the 2010s, these developments coincided with a clearer shift in Cypriot foreign policy towards the United States and the integration of the Eastern Mediterranean—and these trilateral schemes in particular—into Washington’s strategic planning for the broader region. This was reflected in events such as the U.S. Secretary of State’s participation in the 2019 Trilateral Summit in Jerusalem and the adoption of the 2019 EastMed Act by Congress. Additionally, the Eastern Mediterranean increasingly featured in discussions on Europe’s energy security, further enhancing its strategic importance for both regional and extra-regional actors.
The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in U.S. Grand Strategy
The Abraham Accords, first signed in 2020, and the growing U.S. efforts to encourage more Arab states to normalize relations with Israel clearly reflected the United States’ vision for the region and highlighted the complementary roles of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East within the architecture envisioned by Washington. This vision was based on the logic of offshore balancing—namely, an effort to share or shift the burdens of its regional security agenda to partner and allied states while reducing its own presence in the Middle East and elsewhere. The primary targets, as the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy put it, were the “malign influences” of China, Russia, and Iran. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy made these intentions even clearer, with the promotion of the so-called “Donroe Doctrine” and Washington’s stated desire to focus more on the Western Hemisphere.
Since 2022, the combined effects of the war in Ukraine and the post-Gaza conflict dynamics have created a permissive environment for the transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Russia’s strategic overstretch significantly curtailed its ability to act as an external balancer—a role it had effectively played since its 2015 intervention in Syria—while exposing the limits of its global power projection. Its failure to reinforce the Assad regime at a critical juncture underscored this decline, particularly in contrast to the capacity of the United States and its allies to engage in offshore balancing and empower regional partners. The fall of Assad, following the weakening of both Hamas and Hezbollah, thus marked a major setback for Russian influence in the region and highlighted the fragility of its forward revisionism. In its place, a new—albeit contested—regional order has begun to emerge, shaped by increasing U.S. efforts to play a regulating role alongside aligned actors, largely enabled by the strategic distraction and weakening of both Russia and Iran. In this sense, the regional order in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East has been significantly transformed by systemic shifts stemming from the Ukraine conflict and the repercussions of the Gaza war.
Amid such changes, the strategic priorities of the U.S. in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East have undergone a significant transformation, with a clear prioritization of the latter over the former. The evolving balance of power, the weakening of the Axis of Resistance, and the emergence of new regional configurations have pushed the U.S. to keep pursuing offshore balancing, not least by attempting to increase its influence over certain theatres and contribute to the normalization of relations that it sees instrumental for its own objectives. More generally, the U.S. seems to have understood this juncture as opportune to safeguard or reclaim its hegemonic role in the region amidst a fluid international setting. What is more, the ongoing war on Iran demonstrates that Washington and Israel are willing not only to work towards a new regional order, but also to impose it by force.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. has sought to reclaim strategic initiative through a series of diplomatic and military engagements aimed at shaping the emerging regional order. Central to this approach has been the normalization of relations with the new Syrian government following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, with Washington lifting sanctions and supporting reconstruction in an effort to draw Damascus into a Western-aligned framework—potentially extending the Abraham Accords to include Syria alongside partners such as Saudi Arabia and possibly Lebanon. Further, Washington sought to stabilize Gaza—without in fact resolving the problem—recognizing that continued instability there undermines broader regional normalization efforts. Efforts to revive normalization between Israel and Turkey have also regained urgency, though they remain constrained by tensions over Syria, Gaza and broader conflict dynamics in the region. In parallel, Washington has encouraged a gradual realignment in Lebanon, including pressure to weaken Hezbollah, as part of a broader strategy to consolidate a more favourable regional balance.
Deprioritizing the EastMed – the Middle East at the Epicentre
Within this framework, the Eastern Mediterranean—once seen as a rising geopolitical space due to evolving security dynamics and aspirations for regionalism and energy cooperation—has once again been somewhat overshadowed by developments in the Middle East, where stakes are higher and instability more acute. Furthermore, Middle Eastern conflict dynamics and power competitions, such as the enhanced Turkey-Israel rivalry, seem to have the potential of spilling over into the Eastern Mediterranean thus blurring the lines between the two geopolitical systems. From this perspective, its relative deprioritization does not diminish the structural importance of the region—particularly from a European perspective, given that the Eastern Mediterranean is the EU’s southeasternmost border. Its strategic value has also been re-emphasized during recent events surrounding the war on Iran.
Epilogue – Imperatives for Cyprus and the EU
In this respect, the role and significance of Cyprus have also grown in tangible ways. As the southeasternmost member state of the EU, Cyprus occupies a unique geopolitical position at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. This location, in conjunction with the activism Cyprus has developed in recent years, allows it to function both as a forward base for the projection of EU presence and engagement in the region and as a bridge facilitating dialogue, coordination, and cooperation with key regional actors. Its participation in trilateral and multilateral frameworks, as well as its close ties with both regional partners and European institutions, position Cyprus as a potentially valuable enabler of a more active and coherent EU foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.
It is indeed clear, that the war in Ukraine, the post-Gaza conflict dynamics in the Middle East, the evolving strategic posture of the U.S., and most recently the war on Iran have collectively exposed both the extent of the EU’s vulnerabilities and the limits of its influence in a rapidly changing international environment. In response, the EU has accelerated efforts to articulate a more cohesive and autonomous foreign and security policy, seeking to enhance its geopolitical role, strengthen its defence capabilities, and reduce its dependence on external actors. Initiatives aimed at strategic autonomy, energy diversification, and more coordinated external action reflect this growing awareness.
Yet, these efforts have not, thus far, been sufficient to match the scale and speed of ongoing transformations. Internal divisions, institutional constraints, and differing national priorities continue to hinder the emergence of a truly unified European voice, notwithstanding the activism of individual member states. Lastly, the gradual erosion of the norms, assumptions, and practices that have long underpinned the liberal international order—from within as much as from without—further complicates the strategic environment in which the EU operates and exposes the vacuums that it is called to fill. In such a context, the need for a more effective, credible, and strategically coherent European Union is not only evident, but increasingly urgent.
[1] E.g. Tamar, Dalit, Leviathan, and Karish and Tanin.